George Brown reads the signals from Mikulski and others and agrees with much of what they have to say. Further, he sees the danger to science inherent in those signals and the mixed response from the science community, with many individuals hunkering down for the storm to pass rather than seeking a constructive response. Brown puts science policy into the context of the larger problems we face, many of which are rooted in a lack of consensus on sound values, and in a lack of community. He urges scientists to internalize new values; to accept a broader responsibility, e.g., to address the ecologic crisis directly.
The playwright and president of the Czech republic, Vaclav Havel, describes the context we face as a ``crisis of objectivity'' [Havel, 1992]. Brown incorporated Havel's concept into a seminal article on science policy, ``The Objectivity Crisis'' [Brown, 1992]. That article expresses Brown's views on contemporary science policy (which he claims is still based on the Vannevar Bush model) in the broadest context. ``While science has been quick to take credit for societal advance, the path from scientific discovery to... benefit is neither certain nor straight'' [p 779]. Looking beyond the U.S. Brown explains that ``it is not at all clear that advances in science and technology have translated into sustainable advances'' for all humans [p 779]. ``The ever increasing gap... between industrialized and developing nations is fueled... by concentration of technological resources... in the industrial world'' and a similar gap exists between rich and poor in the U.S. [p 779]. Since for decades billions have been spent on research annually, it is clear that benefits of research do not flow automatically to all, even in the U.S. Brown's fundamental argument is that
``Political and social obstacles to a better quality of life... are not the fault of science and technology. But this is exactly my point. Because neither will a better quality of life necessarily be achieved by more science and technology. Yet scientists and politicians alike continue to portray science---and the technology it generates---as the key to a better world and the solution to our most pressing societal problems, including those which were created in part by science and technology in the first place.Brown points out that science is never truly autonomous, never driven solely by scientific questions or criteria; it is guided by departmental and disciplinary boundaries and the need to publish in mainstream journals, and by funding history. In large part extra-scientific considerations guide all science.
``At the same time, there is insufficient effort on the part of the scientific community or their policy-making advocates to visualize what a ``better world'' would look like. Rather we have developed an uncritical faith that wherever science leads us is where we want to go.'' [p 779]
Brown is concerned because ``science---as articulated by scientists and policy-makers alike---has promised much more than it can deliver'' [p 780]. He does not excuse Congress from responsibility; as the comments from Mikulski and others reveal, there is great Congressional faith in the ability (if not the willingness) of science to deliver benefits.
``Our faith in the power of science... may be an explicit roadblock to social action. The very benefits that science promises to deliver may be withheld from us because it is easier---politically, economically, socially, scientifically---to support more research than it is to change ourselves.'' [p 780]
In other words we call for more research rather than pursuing sound values. Brown closes with a call for scientists to recognize their special status---empowered and enriched---and to act accordingly:
``My personal view---subjective in the extreme---is that the ultimate enrichment of the human spirit comes from our ability to expand our realm of experience and knowledge. Scientists must seek to share the privilege of their enrichment with others, not by promising more, faster, stronger machines, but by sharing what they know and how they feel. This demands a renewed commitment to education as the ultimate mechanism for individual empowerment, and a critical prerequisite for social justice. This is a commitment that all scientists can make, in their own backyards, starting now.'' [p 781]
Brown further articulates his views in a speech entitled ``The Mother of Necessity: Technological Policy and Social Equity'' [Brown, 1994]. He identified the fundamental difficulty a Western consumer society faces: Once basic needs are met, many aspirations are not satiated by consumption, rather they seem to be fed by it. There is an inherent contradiction between the liberal economy of such a society and the limits of Earth, thus the ecologic crisis. Market-driven technology also has a way of enlarging gaps---real and perceived---between rich and poor, between those who can afford to acquire and use the technology and those who can only desire it. He sees markets as an ``imperfect artifact of human culture'' and argues that we should stop trying to change reality to conform to this theoretical construct [p 98].
Brown's remarks recall Fukuyama: perhaps we in the West unconsciously believe that since the Cold War is won, we can indulge in consumption fed by an ever-growing economy. But consumption never satisfies, values are wanted. Brown challenges us to move beyond science and technology:
``Now the Cold War is over and our excuse for this behavior is gone. We need a new and better vision... . Neither technology nor economics can answer questions of values. Is our path into the future to be defined by the literally mindless process of technological evolution and economic expansion, or by a conscious adoption of guiding moral precepts?'' [p 102]
Many scientists recoiled from Brown's view and his questioning of long held assumptions. He received many letters from outraged scientists, some revealing a narrow perspective. Nevertheless, Brown continues his efforts to communicate with a reluctant constituency.
The lessons of a glance at the Congressional environment of science would seem to be that Congress believes science has overpromised but has not sincerely tried to help fellow humans. While science is not responsible for the lack of progress on some difficult problems, it is irrelevant to them. In an era of budget stringency and change, irrelevancy is not a stable state. Congress sees a need for fundamental change in the culture and attitudes of science, and if science does not change itself, Congress may use its traditional, blunt instruments to encourage change. It would therefore be healthy if the scientific community and each scientist internalized norms of social responsibility. (For an extended discussion see Brunner and Ascher [1992].)
Congressional and public pressure for accountability likely will grow, for example, and since science does generate useful results it seems it would be better if scientists focussed the accounting on useful results rather than on how resources are spent, i.e., on outputs rather than inputs.
Demonstrating satisfactory results will require making reasonable promises so that reasonable outcomes will meet them [Brunner, 1992]. It may be necessary for scientists to follow their results ``downstream'' a bit to ensure that scientific results become social and political facts, i.e., usable [Meyer-Abich, 1980]. This will be difficult; there is no general recipe and a variety of approaches might be tried. The institution of science could conduct the experiments, beginning with prototypes and propagating what works (see for example Brunner [1993]).
The political environment encourages socially useful science. In Mikulski's view usefulness is national and her report emphasizes economic competitiveness while Brown has a broader view of usefulness, encompassing the human race and basic values. Consideration of a specific example may give more meaning to this generalization.