Are the promises of useful information and credible prediction examples of the temptation to avoid tough issues? In passing P.L. 101-606 calling for usable information Congress tried to take itself off the hook. That is, were the climate to shift tomorrow, Congress could say ``We asked to be kept informed. It's not our fault we aren't ready!'' Of course this is a hollow disclaimer for Congress has not faced the tough question of what information it needs to be ``ready.'' Similarly, in arguing that a thorough understanding of Earth systems is necessary for policy making the USGCRP essentially falls back on the Vannevar Bush model: Basic research leads to understanding and understanding leads to good decisions. Unfortunately, a comprehensive understanding of the Earth realized in a model is an extremely difficult goal, and will do more to rationalize decades of basic research than to support current decisions. However, the program can not evade its responsibility because by implying that a ``rigorous... quantitative prediction'' is necessary it steps outside science and into a very different field, policy. The implication is not believable because policy decisions are made---must be made---every day without a predictive model of the relevant phenomena. Such current decisions need support. Rather than supporting research the community wants to do (the Bush model), it might be wiser for the program to tackle the job of finding out what is needed for decisions being made now.
If the program is not on the right track, the question becomes: How to change direction gracefully; what will be acceptable to users? Recall that users such as Senator Mikulski seek research to address national strategic goals. Given the budget situation there is little hope of simply adding program elements or of increasing funding---for example, for modelling efforts to try to force a solution.
Suppose an oversight committee in the new Congress asks what useful information has been delivered for the several billions already spent? The following argument might be made: The USGCRP had to be started somehow, bootstrapped; scientists had to discover and delineate the problem before they could present it to decision makers. At the beginning they could not ask users what information they needed because the climate problem was not well-defined. This is all true but may be irrelevant.
Although useful results have been delivered not many are a direct consequence of the USGCRP per se and the related incremental spending of the last several years. Compared to what a billion dollars will buy in other areas of research there may not be billions of dollars worth of useful results. The bootstrapping argument may be undermined because after billions of dollars we can no longer claim to be at the beginning of the program. As many global change issues need illumination and related policy issues need support, it would be a major loss if the program fell into disfavor and were cut. Accordingly, consideration should be given to reorienting the USGCRP around the primary goal of prompt and continuing provision of useful information, as defined by those who will use it, and consistent with its legislative mandate. A less drastic alternative would be to rejustify the existing program on scientific grounds and set up a new program to provide information readily usable by officials from what is currently known about global change [Brunner, 1993]. A major activity would be to elicit the information needs of officials, and a major program element would be regular evaluation against such practical needs. The new program could be funded at a low level compared to the USGCRP because it would not need satellites or large data systems; if modest reductions were achieved in the rejustified USGCRP, the two programs could be conducted at the same cost as the original one.
This alternative recognizes two different activities: Generating new information by means of research versus providing readily usable information in response to urgent policy questions. The secret to providing useful information does not lie in short-term reorientation of research to answer urgent questions; unfortunately it does need to be said that because research is slow, urgent questions can be answered only by assessment of what is already known. Such assessments can be provided by analysts working at the policy/science interface and capable of interpreting both policy questions and scientific information. Consequently many more such interface analysts are needed both to answer and to elicit policy questions. (note: A potential source of jobs for some of the oversupply of PhDs in the natural and social sciences.) Research planning can be informed by studying the kinds of specific questions users ask today in order to generate useful information for tomorrow's questions. Participation of interface analysts would be critical to such planning.
To summarize the situation with respect to the USGCRP: